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The private military assistance corporation presents a conundrum
for international law, with both concrete and theoretical dimensions. On
a concrete level, the private military corporation appears at first glance
to be merely a full-service business presenting no threat to international
security. One need only look closely at the services advertised, however,
to see that the security and military assistance such corporations offer
fulfill a function analogous to that of the traditional mercenary, whose
activities the international community has long endeavored to constrain.
Redefined as "security contractors" and sanitized by their connection to
the corporate world, these modern mercenaries are able to evade both
the sanction of public disapproval and the definition of mercenarism un-
der international law. By effectively permitting de facto mercenaries to
masquerade as security contractors, this transformation also eviscerates
the accountability of governments for the actions of mercenaries in their
employment by hiding them behind a corporate veil.
In fact, mercenarism is strongly disfavored under international law.
The United Nations has concluded that mercenarism destabilizes sover-
eign nations and impedes the right of peoples to self-determination, and
a consensus in favor of eradicating mercenarism has been manifest in
positive and customary international legal developments since 1945.
These efforts culminated in the Convention Against Mercenaries, which
entered into force in 2ooi, and in the establishment in 2002 of the Inter-
national Criminal Court, under the jurisdiction of which traditional mer-
cenaries may be tried for war crimes, genocide, or crimes against
humanity, indicating that, after millennia of unconstrained mercenarism,
international legal mechanisms were finally taking shape to confront this
problem decisively.
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2004.
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Mercenarism's metamorphosis during the final decades of the twen-
tieth century, however, has so far enabled modem mercenaries to evade
the reach of a burgeoning international movement toward their eradica-
tion. Efforts to modify international legal definitions to recognize private
military corporations as mercenary companies have been hindered,
thereby causing the letter of the law to diverge from its spirit. Paradoxi-
cally, what was traditionally outside the law now seems to fall within it as
a result of a loophole created by repackaging and re-labeling the prohib-
ited activity while the legal definition of mercenarism was held static. As
matters now stand, these private contractors effectively circumvent all
international constraints, notwithstanding the fact that the use of merce-
naries in any form remains a clear violation of the spirit of international
law.
The most obvious solution to this conundrum appears to be mod-
ernization of international legal definitions of mercenarism to restore
consistency between the letter of the law and its spirit. This could be ac-
complished by changing the traditional definition from a narrow, actor-
oriented conception to one focused on prohibited activities, whether un-
dertaken by individuals or groups, "soldiers of fortune" or "contractors."
Such an expansion of the international definition to encompass merce-
narism in its modern manifestation would not only bring modern merce-
naries back under the law, but would also be instrumental in holding
government actors employing mercenaries through private military cor-
porations accountable for the criminal actions of the mercenaries they
hire.
On a theoretical level, however, the problem posed by the modern
mercenary appears to be nothing more than a symptom of a broader un-
derlying disorder stemming from policy decisions motivated by an intui-
tion that a powerful state is free to disregard international law to
whatever extent it can get away with. The concomitant exploitation by
powerful states of the ambiguities in international legal definitions is fur-
ther illustrated by the recent American flouting of the spirit, if not the
letter, of the Geneva Conventions at Abu Ghraib and Guantinamo Bay.
From this perspective, employment of the modern mercenary can be un-
derstood as merely one facet of a larger philosophical problem posed by
the United States' apparent combination of both the power and the will
to ignore international law in multifold circumstances.
The extraordinary departure from enduring principles of interna-
tional governance represented by the actions of private military corpora-
tions on behalf of the United States in Iraq is further revealed by an
examination of the theoretical underpinnings of the system of interna-
tional legal obligation. The traditional justifications for the binding char-
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acter of the consensus of the international community are no less appli-
cable to the unauthorized use of modem mercenaries, which itself is but
a single, albeit highly consequential, example of a solitary rogue state
wielding force to impose its own mandate in contravention of the legiti-
mate consensus arrived at by the majority of international actors. There
are philosophical grounds, however, for recognizing an obligation to
obey international law, even where it does not carry an enforceable sanc-
tion. Even powerful states have an obligation to comply with interna-
tional law and, in the context examined herein, to refrain from
employing mercenaries without regard to the enforceability of the inter-
national constraints on their use. Ideally, the international definition of
mercenarism should be amended to bring the letter of the law into con-
gruence with its spirit; however, even without such a change, the dictates
of the spirit of international law should nevertheless be recognized as
binding.
Part I of this Note traces the history of international efforts to con-
strain mercenarism. Focusing on the United States as an example, Part II
recounts the change in the form of mercenarism brought about by the
rise of the private military corporation and the concurrent shift in atti-
tude, and then goes on to survey the extent to which the resultant mod-
ern mercenary is currently engaged in the United States' conduct of the
conflict in Iraq. Part III examines the evolution of international defini-
tions of mercenarism, first considering how they came to focus solely on
individual actors to the exclusion of corporate entities and what potential
consequences may result from this divergence of the letter of the law
from its spirit, and then assesses the prospects for modernizing the cur-
rent definition to restore the connection between letter and spirit and at-
tributing liability to state actors for the action of private military
corporations in their employment. Part IV takes a philosophical turn,
situating the paradox of the modern mercenary in the broader context of
compliance with international laws and norms. Starting from the ques-
tion whether states have an obligation to comply with the spirit of inter-
national law, Part IV looks to jurisprudential theory for guidance,
ultimately concluding that even powerful states are legally and morally
obligated to comply with international law, regardless of the existence of
enforceable sanctions, which suggests that whether the legal definition of
mercenarism is modernized or not, the international consensus against
mercenarism constitutes a binding obligation to comply with its spirit.
June 20041
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I. TRADITIONAL MERCENARISM UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Mercenarism has long been a element of warfare. As one commenta-
tor has observed, "[t]he sovereign's resort to mercenaries is as old as his-
tory itself."' Likewise, the primary threat posed by mercenarism was
documented as long ago as Thucydides's history of the Peloponnesian
War.' In the summer of 413 B.C., the Athenians dispatched 1300 merce-
nary swordsmen along the Euripus Strait to stage a surprise attack wher-
ever it might prove advantageous. Landing at Mycalessus, these Thracian
mercenaries scaled the city's walls and laid siege:
The Thracians bursting into Mycalessus sacked the houses and tem-
ples, and butchered the inhabitants, sparing neither youth nor age but
killing all they fell in with, one after the other, children and women,
and even beasts of burden, and whatever other living creatures they
saw .... Everywhere confusion reigned and death in all its shapes; in
particular they attacked a boys' school, the largest that there was in the
place, into which the children had just gone, and massacred them all.3
This episode recounted with revulsion by Thucydides demonstrates the
powerlessness of civilization to constrain the means chosen by mercenar-
ies to achieve their instrumental ends. Although Thucydides intended his
account "as a possession for all time" offering "an exact knowledge of
the past as an aid to the understanding of the future, which must resem-
ble if it does not reflect it,"' the frequency of similar episodes since his
time calls into doubt how much has been learned from past experiences
with mercenarism.
In one sense, then, the problem raised by this Note can be viewed as
merely a reiteration of an old debate, as "500 years after the demarcation
between mercenary and standing armies, 700 years after the formation of
the free companies, and 2300 years after Alexander employed mercenary
Cretan archers, the international community again wrestles with the
question of how to regulate mercenaries."5
Nevertheless, the terms of that debate have changed dramatically in
the last hundred years as systematic efforts were introduced first to regu-
late the conduct of mercenaries and later to put explicit limitations on
their employment by states. Mercenaries "were tacitly accepted before
I. Todd S. Milliard, Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognize and Regulate Pri-
vate Military Companies, 176 MIL. L. REV. I, 2 (2003).
2. See, e.g., THE LANDMARK THUCYDIDES: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR
442-45, 455-56 (Robert B. Strassler ed., Richard Crawley trans., 1996).
3. Id. at 444.
4. Id. at 16.
5. Milliard, supra note I, at io-si .
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the twentieth century,... if not by polite society, then by most states,
their armies, and international law."6 During the twentieth century, how-
ever, the international community evinced an emerging consensus
against their use. In the second half of the century, efforts at interna-
tional control of mercenarism were undertaken in response to post-
colonial developments. In this context, "the first attempts at mercenary
regulation focused on eliminating but one type of mercenary, the indis-
criminate hired gun who ran roughshod over African self-determination
movements in the post-colonial period from 196o to 198o. As mercenar-
ies evolved, however, mercenary regulations did not."7 The international
scheme for regulation of mercenaries thus failed to keep pace with the
emerging category of private corporate soldier. As the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on mercenarism acknowledged as early as the I98os, interna-
tional laws addressing mercenaries have not "caught-up with the changes
brought about by this new kind of security company.",
8
The spirit of international law nevertheless remains clearly opposed
to the use of soldiers of fortune. The strong international consensus that
the use of mercenaries in armed conflict should be prohibited has been
unequivocally manifest in the development of positive law under U.N.
auspices for two decades. In fact, the international community has been
working to place significant legal limitations on the use of mercenaries
since 1970, when the United Nations passed a declaration imposing on
states the duty to prevent the organization of armed groups for dispatch
to other states. 9
In 1984, the General Assembly took an additional step in this direc-
tion by adopting Resolution 39/84, entitled "Drafting of an international
convention against the recruitment, use, financing and training of merce-
naries."'" This resolution charged an existing ad hoc committee of repre-
sentatives from thirty-four member states with the task of completing a
draft convention. Resolution 39/84 articulated the motivations for this
undertaking as follows:
Bearing in mind the need for strict observance of the principles of sov-
ereign equality, political independence, territorial integrity of States
and self-determination of peoples, enshrined in the Charter of the
United Nations...,
6. Id. at 7 (footnote omitted).
7. Id. at 3 (footnote omitted).
8. Kevin A. O'Brien, The New Warrior Class, in WARLORDS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 52, 76
(Paul B. Rich ed., 1999).
9. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N.
GAOR, 25 th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 124, U.N. Doc. A/8o28 (970).
Io. G.A. Res. 39/84, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., 99th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/39/84 (1984).
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Recognizing that the activities of mercenaries are contrary to funda-
mental principles of international law, such as non-interference in the
internal affairs of States, territorial integrity and independence, and se-
riously impede the process of self-determination of peoples struggling
against colonialism, racism and apartheid and all forms of foreign
domination,
Bearing in mind the pernicious impact that the activities of mercenaries
have on international peace and security,
Considering that the progressive development and codification of the
rules of international law on mercenaries would contribute immensely
to the implementation of the purposes and principles of the Char-
ter. .. "
In other words, the mandate for the committee was inspired by the U.N.
Charter itself, as well as the recognition both that "the activities of mer-
cenaries are contrary to fundamental principles of international law" and
that codified rules governing mercenaries would be of crucial importance
to realizing the objectives of the United Nations.
Five years later, in 1989, the ad hoc committee produced a final draft
of the International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financ-
ing and Training of Mercenaries (the "Convention Against Mercenar-
ies"), which defined all enumerated activities in connection with
mercenarism as offenses, prohibited states parties from recruiting, using,
financing, or training mercenaries, demanded their participation by ap-
propriate measures, and required that they make offenses against the
Convention punishable by penalties taking into account the grave nature
of those offenses. 2 In October 2001, having been ratified by twenty-two
states, the Convention Against Mercenaries entered into force. To date,
thirty-four states have signed the Convention and twenty-five states have
ratified it. 3
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN MERCENARY
A. THE MERCENARY SANITIZED
Despite the fact that the Convention Against Mercenaries addresses
a problem the United Nations identified as a significant hindrance to the
ii. Id.
12. G.A. Res. 44/34, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., 72d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/34 (1989)
[hereinafter Convention Against Mercenaries].
13. The United States is not among them. See Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, Report on the Ques-
tion of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the
Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 6oth Sess., 49, U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/2oo4/I 5 (20o3) [hereinafter December 2003 Report].
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implementation of the purposes and principles of its Charter, twenty
years after the adoption of Resolution 39/84 the use of mercenaries has
burgeoned rather than diminished. This situation is due in part to recent
transformations in the image and form of mercenarism, which today pre-
sents itself in a new light -as the business of publicly traded private mili-
tary assistance companies. Instead of continuing to operate in a relatively
clandestine manner, the modern mercenary industry is now conducting
business in broad daylight, out of respectable corporate offices and under
the euphemistic name of "private security," thereby presenting an ever
greater challenge to international legal controls.
The modern mercenary is a private contractor employed by a corpo-
ration that may offer an array of services seemingly having little to do
with actual armed combat. The corporations employing these modern
mercenaries operate behind a variety of faqades and on an increasingly
large scale. In that sense, "[p]rivate military companies take on many la-
bels today, including, among others, mercenary firms, private armies,
privatized armies, private military corporations, private security compa-
nies or firms, private military contractors, military service providers, non-
lethal service providers, and corporate security firms.""
Mercenary services are now being offered by major corporations, ei-
ther directly or through their subsidiaries. One leading private military
corporation, ArmorGroup, "was listed as one of Fortune's ioo fastest
growing companies in 1999 and 2000."'" Another large military firm,
Military Professional Resources Incorporated, "was purchased in 2000 by
L-3 Communications, an entity spun off from military manufacturers Lo-
ral and Lockheed Martin.' 6 Lockheed Martin has also expressed interest
in acquiring Titan Corporation, which provides security and intelligence
personnel to the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq.'7 As the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on mercenarism recently described them,
[t]hese companies are modern, multipurpose, transnational companies,
which do not hesitate to recruit mercenaries for certain of the activities
they offer. They tend to be highly efficient in matters of military sci-
ence, but they also tend to have few scruples about recruiting merce-
naries for difficult, highly dangerous missions in zones and territories
where violence and armed conflicts are taking place."R
14. Milliard, supra note I, at 2.
15. Harry Magdoff et al., Notes from the Editors, MONTHLY Rev., May 2004, available at http://
www.monthlyreview.org/nfteo5O4.htm.
16. Id.
17. Katie Fairbank, Who Investigates Private Interrogators? Use of Contractors to Gather Intelli-
gence Raises Concerns, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 7, 2004, at 22A.
I8. Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, U.N.
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Although the definition of "mercenary" under international law has
not kept pace with the evolution of the private military corporation, as
suggested above, this change in form and the resulting evasion of regula-
tion are clearly inconsistent with the spirit of international law.
B. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE
I. Roots of the American Private Military Corporation
The shifting form and image of the modern mercenary mirrored an
ambivalence in American culture with respect to the issue of mercenar-
ism: On the one hand, the employment of soldiers of fortune is widely
and consistently condemned. On the other hand, mercenaries operating
under the guise of private military corporations have been openly em-
braced, and the United States has played a role in preventing interna-
tional definitions from conflating these two artificially distinguished
categories.
The first of these views is manifest in what Anthony Mockler de-
scribed as an "overwhelmingly strong" American prejudice against the
use of mercenary soldiers -presumably dating from the British employ-
ment of Hessian mercenaries against the Colonists in the Revolutionary
War. 9 As a result, Mockler observed in 1985 that "the United States is
almost the only imperial power in history that has never employed mer-
cenary troops directly (and only with reluctance and secrecy indi-
rectly)."20 U.S. Senate hearings held the same year on the subject of
mercenary training camps in the United States evinced a similar consen-
sus that mercenaries were a largely undesirable phenomenon. In fact,
Senator Jeremiah Denton opened the hearings by describing private
mercenary camps as "a growing national phenomenon which may impact
our foreign policy, our relations with other national states, the safety of
the public, and the image of the United States abroad."2
Although the explicit concept of "mercenary" was considered almost
taboo, however, the Senate hearings also demonstrated the ambivalence
mentioned above toward one particular iteration of mercenary training:
"commercial establishments" referred to as "security consultants" oper-
ating mercenary training camps set up "to afford highly specialized in-
Commission on Human Rights, 58th Sess., Supp. No. 118, 91 27, U.N. Doc. A/58/i 15 (2oo3) [hereinafter
July 2003 Report]. Moreover, these corporations "now operate on the five continents." December
2003 Report, supra note 13, 1 29.
19. ANTHONY MOCKLER, THE NEW MERCENARIES 5 (1985).
20. Id.
21. Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary
on U.S.-Based Private Counterterrorism/Mercenary Training Camps, 98th Cong. (1985) (opening
statement of Hon. Jeremiah Denton).
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struction to law enforcement, corporate security, and military organiza-
tions throughout the world."2 The written testimony of an FBI witness
described these security consultant training camps as "very similar to the
paramilitary and survivalist training camps and encompass[ing] all the
types of training offered by them in addition to providing information to
their graduates regarding foreign employment in security and mercenary
positions abroad."23 Yet the FBI had determined that these commercial
security consultant schools were not violating federal law "by recruiting
mercenaries" because the Mercenary Association, which operated the
schools, gave all attendees a document specifying as follows:
This is to explain the position of the Association on employment of its
membership. There are legal restrictions as to what type of employ-
ment we can offer.... To remain legal, we must restrict our assistance
to the membership to the supplying of information on foreign em-
ployment, and leaving action to the individual.'
Senator Denton specifically excluded this category of mercenary from
consideration on the ground that "the law enforcement or security firm-
connected [camps] are certainly relatively harmless; in fact helpful." 5 In
other words, by offering the same type of mercenary training but refer-
ring to their graduates as "security consultants" and declining to offer
them direct employment, these commercial camps apparently posed no
threat either to the United States' international relations or reputation,
or to the public safety, but in fact were deemed to serve a helpful role.
The sanitization of corporate mercenaries, already foreshadowed at
these 1985 Senate hearings, has progressed dramatically during the past
two decades, and the industry has grown accordingly. At least part of the
explanation appears to lie in the fact that the United States, like other
Western democratic states, has been increasingly reluctant to engage di-
rectly in conflict because of the fear of the political consequences of mili-
tary casualties. 6 As a result, following the end of the Cold War and a
consequent drop in the volume of international governmental peace-
keeping activities, many individuals with military experience and exper-
tise became available to the private sector. 7 As one commentator has
observed, mercenary corporations constitute "a new means of disguised
efforts by their home states to influence conflicts in which the home
22. Id. at 26 (statement of FBI witness Wayne R. Gilbert).
23. Id. at 35 (prepared statement of Wayne R. Gilbert).
24. Id. at 36 (prepared statement of Wayne R. Gilbert).
25. Id. at 26-27 (statement of Hon. Jeremiah Denton).
26. See David Shearer, Outsourcing War, FOREIGN POL'y 68,70 (t998).
27. See Milliard, supra note I, at 12.
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states are technically neutral. '28 In keeping with this image of neutrality,
the reputations of the private companies that supply mercenaries under-
went dramatic changes during the last decade: "[N]ew forms of military
contractors have emerged, able to provide soldiers for training or for the
application of force, openly advertising their availability, resembling
transnational corporations more than shadow criminal movements, sensi-
tive to public relations, and loathe to being described as mercenaries."29
The resultant private security contractor is a relative newcomer to
the mercenary landscape. As Kevin O'Brien has described the "new war-
rior" embodied in the modem mercenary: "Where, ten years ago, such a
category was composed of individuals tasked with personal and installa-
tion protection primarily, private security companies have grown to such
a degree that many of them now include capabilities in transport, intelli-
gence, combat-firepower, and para-medical skills."3 He points out that
the emergence of these private companies has raised unprecedented pol-
icy issues:
Given that war-fighting and security have traditionally been the do-
main of the state, the transference of these capabilities to private cor-
porations has launched debate surrounding.., what steps should and
can be taken to regulate such bodies, making them accountable to ei-
ther national governments or a world body such as the UN.... The
privatization of these activities cannot be controlled in the [traditional]
manner, given that enterprises which enter into commercial agree-
ments with other governments have not, traditionally, fallen under the
rubric of military oversight or arms control.'
In the last decade, as privatization of military operations has accel-
erated, the market for private security contractors has expanded.3" In this
climate, private military contractors have themselves been ever more ex-
plicit about the role they have begun to play with increasing frequency.
Former industry leader Executive Outcomes advertised its services with
a brochure offering "Clandestine Warfare, Combat Air Patrol, Armored
Warfare, Basic and Advanced Battle Handling, and Sniper Training."33
Before its dissolution in 1997, Executive Outcomes publicly assessed the
expansion of the role of these corporations as follows:
28. Juan Carlos Zarate, The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security
Companies, International Law, and the New World Disorder, 34 STAN. J. INT'L L. 75, 82 (1998).
29. MICHAEL V. BHATIA, WAR AND INTERVENTION: ISSUES FOR CONTEMPORARY PEACE OPERATIONS
51 (2o3).
30. O'Brien, supra note 8, at 57.
31. Id. at 58.
32. BHATIA, supra note 29, at 51-52.
33. Elizabeth Rubin, An Army of One's Own: In Africa, Nations Hire a Corporation to Wage
War, HARPER'S, Feb. 1997, at 47.
[Vol. 55:1493
CONSTRAINING MODERN MERCENARISM
A world wide tendency is currently the privatization of security/
policing services. This is mainly due to the scaling down of Military/
Peacekeeping budgets by not only the major powers but also by coun-
tries across the globe. It is therefore foreseen that future peacekeeping/
refugee protection operations will be conducted more and more by
companies such as [Executive Outcomes, which] sees itself as a major
role player in these developments due to its previous experience and
track record in such type of operations.34
2. Outsourcing in Iraq
The issue of the privatized military has recently come to the fore as a
result of the United States' invasion of Iraq in March 2003. For instance,
the United States currently employs roughly 20,000 private military con-
tractors in Iraq-both U.S. citizens and foreigners-an unknown number
of whom are serving as "security" personnel and providing military and
interrogation support to U.S. and Coalition forces. 35 Utilizing a private
army of this size, the United States is at the forefront of military out-
sourcing, with private military contractors accounting for the second
largest force in Iraq.
The ubiquity of such firms in the single example of Iraq is surprising:
Vinnell Corporation, a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman, the second
largest defense contractor in the United States,... has been given the
contract to train the New Iraqi Army. Custer Battles with 1,3oo em-
ployees in Iraq has a contract to guard the Baghdad airport. Dyncorp is
receiving tens of millions of dollars to train the Iraqi police force. 6
ArmorGroup has 8oo security contractors working in Iraq.37 Erinys In-
ternational employs some 14,000 contractors to provide security to Iraq's
oil production facilities 5 Blackwater USA's "Global Elite Troops," who
have engaged in combat in Najaf,39 are serving as bodyguards to Coali-
tion Provisional Authority administrator L. Paul Bremer III and training
34. O'Brien, supra note 8, at 76.
35. David Barstow, Security Companies: Shadow Soldiers in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. t9, 2004, at
A14.
36. Magdoff, supra note 15.
37. Id.
38. Robert Fisk & Severin Carrell, Occupiers Spend Millions on Private Army of Security Men,
INDEP. (U.K.), Mar. 28, 2004, at 21. After the killing in January of four subcontractors hired by Erinys,
"they were revealed to be former members of apartheid-era security forces in South Africa. One had
admitted to crimes in an amnesty application to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission there."
Barstow, supra note 35.
39. Barstow, supra note 35. After the Najaf battle, a spokesperson for Blackwater admitted that
the line between security and combat operations "is getting blurred." Id. Some companies are employ-
ing novel strategies to maintain synthetic distinctions. Custer Battles, yet another private military cor-
poration, has hired Paul Christopher, a West Point philosopher and author of The Ethics of War and
Peace: An Introduction to Legal and Moral Issues (3d ed. 2004), a standard text in military ethics, to
help "the company define its place and policies in the chaos of Iraq." Id.
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Chilean commandos-veterans of the Pinochet regime-to serve along-
side U.S. soldiers.4' Another U.S. private military corporation has con-
tracted with former Polish special forces soldiers to provide "reaction to
threats and liquidation of attackers" in occupied Iraq.4' Aegis Defence
Services, led by Tim Spicer, former director of Sandline International, a
British mercenary firm involved in destabilization efforts in Papua New
Guinea and Sierra Leone, "has won a $425 million cost-plus contract to
co-ordinate private security for reconstruction projects in Iraq."42 Even
more troubling, contractors from CACI International and Titan Corpo-
ration have been linked to the abusive interrogation of Iraqi detainees at
Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad.43
In other words, private military contractors are central to U.S. in-
volvement in Iraq, as is further demonstrated by the government's com-
mitment to their financing, protection, and implicit recognition.
According to political scientist Deborah Avant, approximately thirty
cents of every dollar spent by the U.S. military in Iraq winds up in the
coffers of the more than one hundred private military corporations sup-
porting U.S. troops there, and with recently intensified fighting this per-
centage is probably increasing.' The U.S. government has even solicited
bids for a $ioo million security contract in Baghdad, stating that "[t]he
current and projected threat and recent history of attacks directed
against coalition forces, and thinly stretched military force, requires a
commercial security force that is dedicated to provide Force Protection
security."'45 Moreover, the governmental sanction extends far beyond the
monetary realm. The U.S. military has deployed its forces to rescue mili-
tary contractors in trouble. Some contractors are even being accorded
40. Id. According to The Guardian, "[last month [February 2004] Blackwater USA flew a first
group of about 6o former commandos, many of who[m] had trained under the military government of
Augusto Pinochet, from Santiago to a 2,4oo-acre (97o-hectare) training camp in North Carolina. From
there they will be taken to Iraq." A spokesperson for Blackwater stated that "[w]e scour the ends of
the earth to find professionals-the Chilean commandos are very, very professional." Jonathan Frank-
lin, US Contractor Recruits Guards for Iraq in Chile: Forces Say Experienced Soldiers Are Quitting for
Private Companies Which Pay More for Similar Work, GUARDIAN (U.K.), Mar. 5, 2004, at 14, available
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/chile/story/o,13755,i i6244I,00.html.
41. US-Firma engagiert polnische Ex-Elitesoldaten. Sollen >auf Bedrohungen reagieren und An-
greifer liquidieren , DER STANDARD (Austria), June 2, 2004, available at http://derstandard.at/?url=/
?id=i68o7s9. The translation is the Author's.
42. Rowan Callick, Mercenary Wins Huge Iraq Deal, AUSTRALIAN FIN. REV., June 23, 2004, at i5.
43. Seymour M. Hersch, Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May io, 2004, http://newyorker
.com/fact/content/?o4o5 iofa fact.
44. Christopher Byron, Their Private War; 30% of Iraq War $$ Goes to U.S. Contractors, N.Y.
POST, May 12, 2004, at 39 (interviewing Deborah Avant, professor of political science at George Wash-
ington University).
45. Barstow, supra note 35.
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full military honors when they are killed, even though they are not rec-
ognized as members of the U.S. military for any other purpose.6
Paradigmatic of the new breed of private military corporation is
North Carolina-based Blackwater Security Consulting, currently under
contract with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. In addition to
offering tactical and weapons training to military and paramilitary per-
sonnel worldwide, Blackwater provides "Mobile Security Teams...
comprised of former operators primarily from the ranks of the US spe-
cial operations and intelligence communities," which "stand ready to de-
ploy around the world with little notice in support of US national
security objectives, private or foreign interests., 47 In April 2004, after
four members of one of Blackwater's teams were killed by resistance
fighters in Fallujah, it was reported that
[w]ith every week of insurgency in a war zone with no front, these com-
panies are becoming more deeply enmeshed in combat, in some cases
all but obliterating distinctions between professional troops and private
commandos. Company executives see a clear boundary between their
defensive roles as protectors and the offensive operations of the mili-
tary. But more and more, they give the appearance of private, for-
profit militias .... 8
In an April 8, 2004, letter to U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rums-
feld, Senator Jack Reed echoed some of the concerns raised in the 1985
Senate hearings. Senator Reed protested that private military corpora-
tions under contract in Iraq "operate in a fashion that is hard to distin-
guish from military forces," and that they are "not under military control
and are not subject to the rules that guide the conduct of American mili-
tary personnel," warning that "[ilt would be a dangerous precedent if the
United States allowed the presence of private armies operating outside
the control of governmental authority and beholden only to those who
pay them."49 Yet the response of the Coalition Provisional Authority has
not been to investigate and, if necessary, to prosecute these corporate
46. See, e.g., Guy Kovner & Cecilia Vega, Ex-County Resident Dies in Iraq Ambush; Memorial
Today for Former Army Ranger Who Was Working as Civilian Contractor on Security Detail, PRESS
DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, Calif.), May 4, 2004, at At; Deborah Schoch et al., Death Came Brutally to a
Man Who "Never Quit", L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2004, at i; Thomas J. Sheeran, Two Security Contractors
Killed in Iraq Are Buried, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. II, 2004, at 22; Ronald D. White, For
Titan, Deaths Hit Close to Home, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2004, at CI.
47. Blackwater Security Consulting, http://www.blackwatersecurity.com/services.html (last visited
June 6, 2004). In case things get particularly ugly, Blackwater also offers "full protective detail for any
threat scenario." Id.
48. Barstow, supra note 35. See also David Barstow, Security Firms Says Its Workers Were Lured
into Iraqi Ambush, N.Y. TimEs, Apr. 19, 2004, at As.




mercenaries but to immunize all private contractors from civil and crimi-
nal liability for the duration of the Authority's existence.', As these con-
ditions reveal, the questions regarding the definition of mercenarism and
the proper steps to constrain it are not idle matters.
III. DIVERGENCE OF THE LETTER AND SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. THE MODERN MERCENARY No LONGER STANDS OUTSIDE THE LAW
The rise of the corporate mercenary has effectively resulted in a di-
vergence between the letter and the spirit of international law. Because
existing international definitions of mercenarism focus more on individ-
ual actors than on the actions to be prohibited, today's private military
contractors can act as virtual mercenaries without being subject to the
laws purporting to govern mercenarism. In essence, they have defined
themselves out of existence under international law, so that activities re-
cently falling outside the law now paradoxically appear to fall within the
scope of legality when engaged in by private military corporations.
The conundrum presented by private military corporations is thus
that "the international laws of war that specifically deal with their pres-
ence and activity are largely absent or ineffective."'" This situation exists
primarily because "the existing laws do not adequately deal with the full
variety of private military actors. That is, they are specifically aimed at
only the individuals working against national governments or politically
recognized movements of national liberation."5 Such gaps in the law
mean not only that private military corporations themselves are not di-
rectly regulated, but also that the organization of mercenary forces be-
hind the corporate veil serves as protection against liability for those who
hire them.
As a result, neither of the two primary international mechanisms for
constraining mercenary conduct is effective against private military con-
tractors or their corporate or ultimate state employers. As noted above,
the Convention Against Mercenaries makes it an explicit offense to em-
ploy mercenaries; however, the Convention contemplates mercenaries
acting as individual combatants and is therefore unlikely to cover corpo-
rate mercenaries because of their employment as private "contractors"
50. Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17, Statute of the CPA, MNF-Iraq, Certain Missions
and Personnel in Iraq (Rev.) (June 27, 2004), available at http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/
2004o627_CPAORDi7 Status of._Coalition RevwithAnnexA.pdf. The Authority plans to ex-
tend this blanket immunity beyond the termination of its rule in Iraq. See Robin Wright, U.S. Immu-
nity in Iraq Will Go Beyond June 30, WASH. PosT, June 24, 2004, at Ai.
5i. Peter W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and Interna-
tional Law, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 521, 525 (2004).
52. Id. at 531.
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by firms that provide a full array of services and the resulting uncertainty
regarding whether these contractors are engaged in conflict.
The other possible avenue for constraining the actions of private
military contractors is the International Criminal Court (the ICC), estab-
lished to try "natural persons" for war crimes as described in the Geneva
Conventions.53 A traditional mercenary committing a war crime could be
subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC 4 Under the principles embodied in
the Rome Statute, superiors of traditional mercenaries might be triable
in the ICC for the crimes of the mercenaries under their supervision.
This potential international legal mechanism for trying traditional mer-
cenaries and their superiors for war crimes, like the Convention Against
Mercenaries, does not appear to extend to the situation of the modern
mercenary."
Despite this evidence, the belief that modern mercenaries have es-
caped jurisdiction through a loophole in international law is not univer-
sally held. Officials from the Dutch ministry of defense have posited that
the actions of employees of private military corporations in Iraq are gov-
erned by both U.S. and Iraqi law, and that, ultimately, "the country that
has hired them.., is responsible at all times for what private contractors
do or fail to do." 6 Accordingly, Dutch troops serving in Iraq have been
instructed to act with force against private contractors "if they are found
in breach of international rules of warfare." 7 Thus, the international con-
sensus against the use of mercenaries in armed conflict remains in effect
in at least some quarters without regard to changes in form. Nonetheless,
there is widespread agreement that the question is not simple, because
"[t]he various loose formulations of exactly who is a mercenary, as well
as the absence of any real mechanism for curtailing mercenary activities,
53. See Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. i, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.i83/9 (0998)
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
54. Superiors of persons who committed war crimes have been held liable by the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda for their inferiors' actions. See Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res 955, art 6(3), U.N. Doc. S/RES/95 5 (I994); see also Prosecutor v. Jean
de Dieu Kamuhanda, ICTR-95-54A-T (2004). The most famous of these decisions, the so-called "Me-
dia Cases," are discussed in Catherine A. MacKinnon, Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, &
Ngeze, 98 AM. J. Irr'L L. 325, 327 (2004).
55. The Author asked Judge Philippe Kirsch whether the ICC's jurisdiction could extend to cor-
porate entities engaging in mercenarism. He replied that the question was yet to be decided. Conver-
sation with Judge Philippe Kirsch, President of the International Criminal Court, World Affairs
Council, San Francisco, Calif. (Jan. 12, 2004).





creates difficulties for anyone attempting to curtail [private military] ac-
tivity by use of international law." 5
B. MODERN MERCENARISM DOES NOT COMPORT WITH
TRADITIONAL DEFINITIONS
Traditional definitions of mercenarism were not designed to encom-
pass the private military corporations in which mercenary bands are em-
bodied today. In fact, the discontinuity between the international
definition and today's actuality has a lengthy history. Even prior to the
most recent developments in modern mercenarism, arriving at an inter-
nationally accepted definition of mercenaries seems to have been an in-
surmountable problem. As one commentator observed in 1992,
"[p]roblems with the meaning of the word 'mercenary' have plagued
popular and technical discussions over the centuries and are reflected in
much contemporary debate, especially about legal measures to be taken
against mercenaries." 9 In fact, Assistant Secretary of State William
Schaufele testified before Congress in 1976 that "[a] legally accepted
definition of what constitutes a mercenary does not exist in international
law."" Even as international law did develop specific definitions, it re-
mained the case that, as the U.N. Special Rapporteur on mercenarism
explained,
[the] international legal instruments that serve as a framework for the
consideration of the question are imperfect and contain gaps, inaccura-
cies, technical defects and obsolete terms that allow overly broad in-
terpretations to be made. Thus, for example, a person who is to all
intents and purposes a mercenary agent could take advantage of some
of the imprecise legal situations to avoid being classified as such.6 1
International legal definitions recognize neither the corporate struc-
ture nor the new names by which mercenaries are designated private se-
curity contractors. As a result, "the privatized military industry lies
outside the full domain of all of these existing legal regimes. ,6 This defi-
58. Singer, supra note 51, at 532.
59. C.A.J. Coady, Mercenary Morality, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 55 (A.G.D.
Bradney ed., 1992).
60. EDWARD K. KWAKWA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: PERSONAL AND MATE-
RIAL FIELDS OF APPLICATION 117 (1992) (quoting testimony before House International Relations
Committee reprinted in DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INT'L LAW 714-15 (E. McDowell ed., 1976)).
61. Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of
Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, U.N.
Commission on Human Rights, 5 4th Sess., I 6o, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1 998/31 (1998). More concretely,
the Convention "contains a number of loopholes regarding the requirements relating to nationality,
residence, [and] changes in nationality to conceal identity as a mercenary," which would permit citi-
zens of state members of the Coalition who work for private military corporations in Iraq to escape
jurisdiction. December 2003 Report, supra note 18, T 540.
62. Singer, supra note 51, at 532.
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nitional lacuna is longstanding and widespread, and gradually becoming
more and more significant as the traditional visage of the mercenary is
hidden by a sanitized corporate mask. As a result, "the status of [private
military corporations] under international law is ambiguous in that there
are no regimes that exactly define or regulate them. The current legal
definitions designed for individual mercenaries are neither fully applica-
ble to Jprivate military corporations] nor effective in and of them-
selves." Similarly, because modern mercenaries constitute a new entity
not incorporated into any standard international legal definitions of the
term "mercenary," none of which contemplates the organization of mer-
cenaries into corporations; their actions are not attributable under inter-
national law to the state actors who hire them.
i. Evolving Definition Under the Convention Against Mercenaries
Mercenaries were first explicitly defined under international law by
the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (the "Addi-
tional Protocols"), which provided the following definition of "merce-
nary," focusing exclusively on individuals:
2. A mercenary is any person who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an
armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the
desire for private gain and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a
Party to the conflict, material compensation substantially in excess of
that promised or paid to combatants of similar ranks and functions in
the armed forces of that Party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of
territory controlled by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict;
and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict
on official duty as a member of its armed forces.'
After years of drafting, the United Nations in 1989 adopted the In-
ternational Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and
Training of Mercenaries (the "Convention Against Mercenaries"), which
took effect in 2001. 6' The Convention Against Mercenaries, which makes
63. Id. at 534.
64. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug. 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 47, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 (June 8,
'977).
65 . Convention Against Mercenaries, supra note 12.
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it an offense to recruit, use, finance or train mercenaries, incorporates a
definition of mercenarism virtually identical to that of the Additional
Protocols, and also adds the following, in both cases concentrating exclu-
sively on individual actors:
2. A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:
(a) Is specially recruited locally or abroad for the purpose of par-
ticipating in a concerted act of violence aimed at:
(i) Overthrowing a Government or otherwise undermining
the constitutional order of a State; or
(ii) Undermining the territorial integrity of a State;
(b) Is motivated to take part therein essentially by the desire for
significant private gain and is prompted by the promise or payment of
material compensation;
(c) Is neither a national nor a resident of the State against which
such an act is directed;
(d) Has not been sent by a State on official duty; and
(e) Is not a member of the armed forces of the State on whose
territory the act is undertaken. 6'
Therefore, both of these international definitions exclude the possi-
bility of mercenarism taking the kind of corporate form in which is mani-
fest today. This failure to capture the potential relationship between
states and intervening corporations that supply mercenaries was not
merely the result of lack of foresight on the part of the drafters. In fact,
the definition of the term "mercenary" was vigorously disputed among
the drafters of the Convention Against Mercenaries, as was also the case
with the drafting of the Additional Protocols. The bias in favor of charac-
terizing mercenaries in individual rather than corporate terms is manifest
particularly clearly in the Convention's drafting process, which illustrates
the source of the difficulty in holding states accountable for war crimes
committed by third-party mercenaries working on their behalf. An early
proposed draft specifically provided that the prohibitions on numerous
actions having to do with mercenarism-including, inter alia, enlisting,
training, or promoting mercenaries -would be applicable to groups or
associations. Yet this specification of "groups" was almost immediately
replaced by the more limited word "person," thereby excluding corpora-
tions from liability under the Convention for engagement in such activi-
66. Id.
67. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention Against the
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, 4oth Sess., Supp. No. 43, at 36, U.N. Doc
A14o/43 (1985) (draft of Article 3 §§ (a) and (c)).
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ties." In 1989, when the final draft was agreed upon, the relevant lan-
guage had been even further narrowed to confine liability for mercenary
activities to "[a]ny person who recruits, uses, finances or trains mercenar-
ies," or any "person" who was the accomplice of a person committing of-
fenses prohibited by the Convention.
69
The reversion to the use of the word "person" significantly limited
the applicability of the Convention Against Mercenaries to today's pri-
vate military corporations. As Peter Singer of the Brookings Institution
has observed, "[u]nfortunately, the [Convention] had extremely poor
timing. The document came out just as the private military trade began
to transform, from only being made up of individual mercenaries to be-
ing dominated by private companies."'7 Thus, "the only real legal sanc-
tion available applies not to the firms, but only to their employees, and
only in very limited circumstances."7
The weaknesses in the definition of "mercenary" under international
law have begun to be addressed on an official level. In 2002, the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights asked the Special Rapporteur on merce-
narism, Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, to take account of the "new forms,
manifestations and modalities" of mercenarism.72 In his July 2003 Report,
Ballesteros analyzed the present situation and concluded "that the defi-
nition of mercenary contained in article I of the [1989 Convention] is
very difficult to apply in practice and that, if mercenary activities are to
be prevented, eradicated and punished, the definition must be modified
by amending the Convention."73
Ballesteros posited that mercenarism was taking on new forms as a
result of the absence of adequate international legislation. He observed
that "the legal instruments available to define mercenary acts and char-
acterize mercenary conduct are insufficient and in some aspects deficient
or have serious gaps."'74 After referring to the emergence of private in-
ternational security and military consultancy companies that recruited
mercenaries for a variety of services and whose operations were facili-
tated by loopholes in international law, Ballesteros concluded that the
68. See id. at 26 (draft Article 3).
69. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Drafting of an International Convention Against the
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 43, at 12, U.N. Doc.
A/44/43 (t989) (draft of Articles 2 and 4).
70. Singer, supra note 51, at 531.
7t. Id. at 534.
72. The Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of
the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc
E/CN.4IRES/2002/5 (2002).




lack of clear, comprehensive and consistent international legislation
prohibiting mercenary activities is one of the chief problems detected
in relation to mercenaries.... Furthermore, the increasing tendency of
mercenaries to hide behind modern private companies providing secu-
rity and military advice and assistance my be due to the fact that inter-
national legislation has not taken account of new forms of mercenary
activity.75
In other words, authentic mercenaries tend to rely on those imperfec-
tions and legal loopholes to avoid being characterized as such." Alluding
to Executive Outcomes' past involvement in the securing of diamond
mines in Angola, Ballesteros wrote of "put[ting] a stop to the presence of
private military security companies, which were recruiting mercenaries
and were linked throughout the [I99os] to lucrative business interests."'
He also noted that a government that hires mercenaries or mercenary
corporations "for its own defence and political purposes.., to bolster
positions in armed conflicts does not change the nature of the act or its
illegitimacy." 8 The "tasks of security, public order and defence" are con-
stitutionally state functions, and therefore states are "not authorized to
recruit and employ mercenaries" to carry them out.79
Ballesteros therefore proposed a new definition in his December
2003 Report, which would amend Articles 1-3 of the Convention Against
Mercenaries, including a specific reference to organizations:
2. A mercenary is also any person who, in any other situation:
(b) Is neither a national of a party to the conflict nor a resident of
territory controlled by a party to the conflict or of the country in which
the crime is committed. An exception is made for a national of the
country affected by the crime, when the national is hired to commit the
crime in his country of nationality and uses his status as national to
conceal the fact that he is being used as a mercenary by the State or
organization that hires him. Nationality obtained fraudulently is ex-
cluded ....
This proposed amendment goes beyond the definition originating in the
1977 Additional Protocols to "include both the mercenary as individual
agent and mercenarism as a concept related to the responsibility of the
75. Id. E 48-49.
76. Id. 1 50.
77. Id. 27. This linkage seems readily apparent in present-day Iraq, where private military cor-
porations are providing heavily armed mercenaries presumably to protect the interests of the occupy-
ing power and multinational corporations with which it has contracted to administer Iraq's national
mineral and water supplies.
78. Id. I 54(i).
79. Id.
80. December 2003 Report, supra note 13, 1 47.
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State and organizations concerned in the planning and execution of mer-
cenary acts."8' Ballesteros argued that private military corporations
should be regulated and placed under international supervision."' "They
should be warned, however, that recruiting mercenaries who commit the
acts set forth in the International Convention amounts to a violation of
international law and will entail prosecution of both the mercenary and
the agency that hires and employs him."" 3 This expanded definition, if
adopted, would mark a decisive first step in constraining modern merce-
narism under international law.
Nevertheless, the certainty of the proposed definition's fate has been
called into serious questions by recent events. As this Note was going to
print, the United Nations announced the appointment of a new Special
Rapporteur on mercenarism84 to replace Enrique Ballesteros, who had
served since the creation of the mandate in 1987. 8' The newly appointed
rapporteur, Dr. Shaista Shameem, director of the Fiji Human Rights
Commission, hails from a country well-known for supplying mercenaries
to the world, some of whom are working today as private security con-
tractors in occupied Iraq.86 It is unclear from preliminary reports whether
Shameem will follow Ballesteros's path or chart a narrower course. In an
interview soon after her appointment, however, Shameem asserted that
Fijians currently employed in Iraq by private military corporations could
not be classified as mercenaries under the existing definition."' She was
also careful to distinguish her task from her predecessor's -which was to
"widen the definition of mercenary in the Convention but also within the
legal framework"-stating that her "specific mandate doesn't actually
apply unless those people are used to destabilise the integrity of the state
in which they're working." 8 As a final point, Shameem conceded that,
"although we'd like to see [mercenary] activity lessened, we know that
81. July 2003 Report, supra note 18, 1 6o.
82. Id. I 54(h).
83. Id. 68.
84. See Human Rights Commission Chairman Nominates Experts for Fact-finding Mechanisms
(July 7, 2004), http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2oo4/hrcni ioo.doc.htm.
85. Press Release, United Nations, Shaista Shameem Appointed Special Rapporteur on the Use
of Mercenaries (Aug. 2, 2004), http://www.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/hro4o83E.htm. For an
account of the original mandate, see Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, Report on the Question of the Use
of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the Right of Peo-
ples to Self-Determination 84, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
1997/24 ('997).
86. Fiji Iraq Guards Not Mercenaries: Shameem, Fiji Live (Aug. 5, 2004), http://www.fijilive.com.
87. Id.
88. Nic Maclellan, Fiji: Human Rights Activist Appointed as UN Expert, Pacific Beat, ABC




the reality is that there's huge money involved in this sort of thing and
we're not likely to see it dissipating in the near future."
9
2. Defining the Scope of the International Criminal Court
For essentially the same reasons discussed above, it is also unlikely
that the ICC could serve as a means of holding state actors accountable
for the actions of private military corporations. Article 25 of the Rome
Statute establishing the ICC addresses "Individual criminal responsibil-
ity," and section i thereof states that the ICC shall have jurisdiction over
"natural persons," a term not defined in the Statute.9 On its face, this
suggests that neither organizations nor states responsible for war crimes
would come under the jurisdiction of the court. A close reading of the
Statute, however, leaves it unclear whether such entities could escape li-
ability for crimes committed by "persons" in their employ. Thus, the pos-
sibility cannot be ruled out that the court could, under certain
circumstances, exercise jurisdiction over private military corporations or
the relevant state actors that hire them. To determine whether "natural
persons" could be extended to include corporate or governmental enti-
ties, the court would need to proceed down the hierarchy of legal author-
ity as provided in Article 2 i(i) of the Rome Statute.'
The same tensions regarding the content of definitions affected
drafting decisions even more transparently in connection with the estab-
lishment of the International Criminal Court. As noted above, Article 25
of the Rome Statute states that the ICC shall have jurisdiction over
"natural persons" yet does not define this term.9" In fact, an early draft of
what would eventually become the Rome Statute demonstrates that lan-
guage expressly conferring ICC jurisdiction over organizations or states
was intentionally omitted from the final version. This draft included lan-
guage providing that "[t]he Court shall also have jurisdiction over legal
persons, with the exception of States, when the crimes committed were
committed on behalf of such legal persons or by their agencies or repre-
sentatives."93 Following lengthy negotiations, however, this proposed
language was removed, thereby limiting the ICC's jurisdiction to natural
persons.94
89. Id.
9o. Rome Statute, supra note 53, art. 25(0).
91. Id. art. 21(l).
92. Id.
93. Draft Statute for the International Criminal Court, art. 23, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.i83/2/Add.I
(998).
94. Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law over Legal
Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court, in LIABILIY OF MUL-




Furthermore, Article 15(4)(g) of the 1991 International Law Com-
mission's Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Man-
kind set forth a definition of "aggression" that included "the sending by
or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another State."95 In the same
spirit, Article 23 of the Draft Code included a prohibition on the "Re-
cruitment, use, financing and training of mercenaries."" Yet both of
these provisions were ultimately omitted from the final Rome Statute.
On a related note, a panel of international legal experts convened by
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights recommended in
2001 that "[a]lthough the Statute of the International Criminal Court
does not refer to mercenaries .... further consideration should be given
to the extent to which mercenarism could be considered an aggravating
circumstance in the event of liability for genocide, crimes against human-
ity and war crimes,"' which might have provided a "back channel" by
which jurisdiction could be conferred. Ultimately, however, the U.N.
Special Rapporteur on mercenarism concluded that this connection
could not be made until the legal definition of "mercenary" was changed
to include private military contractors. 8 Even if these contractors were
covered by the applicable definition, however, attributing liability for any
war crimes they committed upward to the relevant state or corporate ac-
tors who employed them would remain very difficult. In the end, liability
appears to stop at the individual, for
[t]here are no possibilities of threats of company fines or dissolution, as
no international laws specifically recognize the existence of the firms.
There is also no mechanism for dealing with clients who hire the
firms.... In fact, the only real legal sanction available applies not to
the firms, but only to their employees, and only in very limited circum-
stances.'
Finally, Article 98 of the Rome Statute preserves the core principle
of the many status-of-forces agreements in effect between the United
States and other countries to the effect that a nation "sending" military
forces deployed on foreign soil-the "sending State"-retains primary
criminal jurisdiction over its forces unless it consents to local prosecu-
tion."w Formally, the United States negotiated the words "sending State"
95. Report on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, International
Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 4 6th Sess., Supp. No. to, at 238, art. 15(4(g)), U.N. Doc. A/46/IO
(1990.
96. Id. art. 23.
97. July 2003 Report, supra note 18, 57.
98. Id. 58.
99. Singer, supra note 55, at 533-34.
ioo. Rome Statute, supra note 53, art. 98. The text of Article 98 reads:
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to ensure that Americans sent on official missions overseas would retain
this important protection. Informally, although Article 98 was not explic-
itly intended to protect unofficial actions, such as those taken by merce-
naries or others not acting under express governmental authority, the
ambiguous status of private military corporations makes it unclear
whether they would be covered.'O Given this multiplicity of mechanisms
for limiting liability, it appears unlikely that the ICC could by itself serve
as an effective constraint on modern mercenarism.
3. Implications of the Persistent Definitional Lacuna
This persistent interpretation of mercenaries as individual agents
whose deployment is only attributable to relevant state actors or persons
who deal with them directly-but not intervening corporations-
effectively immunizes state actors employing mercenaries through the
conduit of the private security corporation from liability for any crimes
they might commit, whether authorized or ratified by the state or not.
Because the definition of "person" in international law encompasses only
natural persons and not legal persons such as corporations, attribution up
the chain of command of the actions of mercenaries working for private
military corporations is impossible under the relevant provisions of in-
ternational law. Without recognition of the corporate entity as a neces-
sary conduit between the employing state and the private soldier, the law
lacks any positive basis for making the connection between the actions of
the individual mercenary and the state actors on whose behalf those ac-
tions were undertaken. Nor, because of the same failure to provide for a
means of attributing liability upward to an entity other than a person or a
state actor, is it possible to link the actions of individual mercenaries to
the corporations who hire them directly. The corporation as an actor in-
volved in mercenary activities is a legal category that simply does not ex-
Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender
i. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would re-
quire the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law
with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State,
unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the
immunity.
2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the re-
quested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pur-
suant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State
to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the
giving of consent for the surrender.
ioi. In other words, the United States has made what appear to be repeated attempts to exempt
its citizens and agents from the international legal system by ensuring the inclusion of Article 98 in the
Rome Statute to limit the ICC's jurisdiction over U.S. agents and then nevertheless un-signing the
Statute, as well as making side agreements with foreign nations and the U.N. Security Council to
shield U.S. agents from liability for any potentially criminal behavior in which they may engage while
abroad.
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ist, either as a subject of liability or as a channel through which liability
could flow to a state.
Furthermore, the U.S. military itself may be compromised by the
outsourcing of its most critical operations to private companies. Instead
of a controllable, accountable command structure, the armed forces
could become a decentralized complex of private, for-profit entities re-
sponsive to nothing more binding than contractual obligations. As has
been demonstrated by the abusive treatment of prisoners under the su-
pervision of private interrogators at Abu Ghraib, °2 reliance on private
corporations to perform sensitive military operations can be misguided.
This is no less true in the context of combat.
Various commentators have made much of the failure of interna-
tional law to recognize the new form taken by the mercenary. Essentially,
these views fall into two camps: those who advocate a reassessment of ex-
isting definitions, and those who believe no adequate definition can be
formulated for an industry of this complexity. Adherents to the former
view are themselves divided over whether the proper control of merce-
naries would involve a complete prohibition or mere regulation. Taking
the latter of these viewpoints, U.S. Army Judge Advocate Todd Milliard
argues that "today's international provisions aimed at mercenary regula-
tion suffer from myopic analyses because, in law and fact, they are still
directed at controlling post-colonial mercenary activities in Africa."" As
a result, "existing international law provisions were designed to regulate
only one type of mercenary, the unaffiliated individual that acted counter
to the interests of post-colonial African states.""°4 This outlook suggests
that the gap in the laws can - and should - be rectified by a simple defini-
tional change, such as that proposed by the U.N. Special Rapporteur
Ballesteros, which "is not limited to the mercenary as an individual agent
but includes mercenarism as a concept related to the responsibility of the
State and other organizations and individuals." °5 Ballesteros would take
Milliard's view a step further, advocating the eradication rather than
mere regulation of today's modern mercenaries."
Prominent among those in the other camp is Peter Singer, who ex-
presses a more doubtful point of view. Noting that "no international laws
specifically recognize the existence of [private military corporations]," he
opines that,
102. Hersch, supra note 43.
103. Milliard, supra note 14, at 5.
104. Id. at 5.
1O5. July 2003 Report, supra note I8, at 2.
io6. December 2003 Report, supra note 13, 64.
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[p]articularly with regard to [private military corporations], what little
law exists has been rendered outdated by the new ways in which these
companies operate. In short, international law, as it stands now, is too
primitive in this area to handle such a complex issue that has emerged
just in the last decade."
In contrast to Milliard and Ballesteros, Singer concludes
that defining mercenaries is extremely difficult, if not outright impossi-
ble, and certainly of no assistance in dealing with the [private military]
industry. Moreover, existing international law neither regulates nor
forbids the activities of mercenaries, but rather proposes a definition
and specifies their legal status only under certain conditions.'9
Singer appears to embrace the view that international law is an inade-
quate vehicle for the control of private military corporations, even in the
mild form of regulation. In disregard of the Convention Against Merce-
naries, which he discounts elsewhere because of its dearth of signato-
ries,"° he implies that existing international law is too insignificant to
matter, reinforcing his conclusion quoted above that international law "is
too primitive in this area to handle such a complex issue ..... This attitude
is increasingly prevalent; however, this Note will argue that it is based on
a misinterpretation of the binding nature of the spirit reflected not only
in positive but also in customary international law.
IV. THE OBLIGATORY NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. THE EMPLOYMENT OF MERCENARIES Is PART OF A PATTERN OF
DISREGARDING INTERNATIONAL LAW
Updating the definition of "mercenary" in the Convention Against
Mercenaries to encompass corporate mercenaries and similarly amend-
ing the Rome Statute would lay the groundwork for the upward imputa-
tion of liability for war crimes committed by private contractors. Were
these changes to be made, they would presumably provide additional
protection to both states that have ratified the Convention and states
party to the ICC. Yet this would not fully address the problem posed by
the United States, the largest employer of private military contractors in
the world, which has not ratified the Convention and would be even less
likely to do so were these changed implemented. The use of private mili-
tary corporations by the United States is only one among a number of
examples manifesting a more general mindset prevalent in recent Ameri-
can foreign policy regarding international law as not binding unless
107. Singer, supra note 51, at 525-26 (footnote omitted).
io8. Id. at 533 (footnote omitted).
io9. Id. at 53I.
ito. Id. at 525-26 (footnote omitted).
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backed by enforceable sanctions. In the context of international regula-
tion of mercenarism, the belief appears to be that the divergence of the
letter of the law from its spirit resulting from the definitional uncertainty
renders international efforts to eliminate mercenarism irrelevant. This
view is in contrast with a more traditional perspective from which inter-
national laws and conventions are seen as representing the aspiration of
the community of nations that its member states conduct their affairs in
accordance with rules intended for the mutual benefit of each state. To
be bound by the rules of international law would therefore seem to be a
necessary consequence of existence as a state, as each state is by defini-
tion a member of the international community.
Notwithstanding the coherence of this latter view, certain states rou-
tinely deny that they are bound by international law and conduct them-
selves as though they are beyond its reach. Recent analyses of
international law put forward by lawyers for the United States govern-
ment, contained in classified memoranda to executive department offi-
cials,"' provide a contemporary example of a state attempting to argue
that it can circumvent not just international custom but positive interna-
tional conventions to which it has agreed to be bound, on the assumption
that such laws create no obligations of compliance. These memoranda,
taken together with the United States' extensive employment of private
military contractors and the potentially coerced side agreements preclud-
ing legal action against agents of the United States, seem to comprise a
concerted effort by the United States to extricate itself from its obliga-
tions under international law. Thus, the use of modern mercenaries in
contravention of the manifest spirit of international law appears to be
only one part of an overall pattern of evading international law.
Such governmental policy decisions have been supported by a vari-
ety of academic arguments suggesting that the United States need give
no credence to international law because, for example, its rules are not
followed and it possesses no meaningful sanctions with which to force
states into compliance."' These foundational attacks on the validity of in-
ternational law raise a number of threshold questions prefatory to the ul-
timate question whether international law creates obligations: Is
international law really law? If so, is its validity eviscerated by noncom-
iII. See, e.g., Draft Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and
Robert J. Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, General Counsel, Department of De-
fense, Application of Treaties and Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 9, 2002); Memoran-
dum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the
President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under i8 U.S.C. §§ 234 o-234oA (Aug. 1, 2002); see
also Neil A. Lewis & Eric Schmitt, Lawyers Decided Bans on Torture Didn't Bind Bush, N.Y. TIMES,
June 7, 2004, at AI.
112. See Part IV(B)(2), infra.
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pliance or the absence of sanctions? How could international law create
a binding legal obligation? Would this obligation be legal or moral?
These questions will be addressed below in an effort to tackle the ulti-
mate question of whether any state can legitimately escape the dictates of
international law. This Note argues that some form of international law,
either positive or customary, is by definition binding on all states. Of
course, at present the international community appears unable to pre-
vent the United States from doing what it pleases. Should that circum-
stance, however, suffice to call into question the legitimacy of the
international legal system?
B. THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SHOULD BE BINDING EVEN IF THE
LETTER OF THE LAW DIVERGES
I. Is International Law Really Law?
In order to address the question whether international law creates
obligations, it is first necessary to determine whether international law is
really law. The positivist critique laid out by H.L.A. Hart in The Concept
of Law"3 suggests a useful framework for formulating an answer. The
weight of this question is compounded by the frequently expressed con-
cern that international law lacks sovereign force and cannot be binding,
and that only a system of "might makes right" among sovereign states ex-
ists at the international level. Hart bifurcated the question of the validity
of international law into separate but interdependent inquiries: whether
states are fundamentally capable of being the subjects of legal obligation
and whether international law can bind them."4 This Note will assume an
affirmative answer to the first question and will focus on the latter ques-
tion, which Hart himself suggested was intimately related to the question
whether international laws, given their ambiguous character, can give
rise to obligations."5
International law, broadly construed, is the body of rules that can be
derived from observation of the interaction of state actors on the interna-
tional stage. Although Hart was skeptical as to whether states can be "ac-
tors" for purposes of law, he would admit that states can clearly consent
to treaties on signature and ratification. " ' States tacitly consent to be
bound by customary international law through their participation in de-
velopment of customary law and norms, from which what Hart calls pri-
mary rules, the first component of a legal system, are derived. If we
accede to the idea of an international society of states, we see that states
113. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213-37 (2d ed. 1994).
114. Id. at 216.
115. Id.
ii6. Id. at 220-32.
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consent to be bound by the general system of customary international
law, or primary rules, by participation in world affairs. Thus, it would ap-
pear that sovereign states are capable of being the subjects of legal obli-
gation, once we acknowledge that states can be "actors" for purposes of
law. For the primary rules of international law to exist therefore requires
only this minimal behavior by states, which itself gives rise to a norm of
international law.
2. Is International Law Eviscerated by Failures of Compliance?
Nevertheless, a prevailing academic and policy view is that the inter-
national legal system has broken down, a representative statement of
which is offered by Michael Glennon."7 Glennon contends that, because
its rules have repeatedly failed to prevent the illegal use of force by one
state against another, the Charter of the United Nations is no longer
valid and can be disregarded." 8 The Charter's lack of credible threats of
enforcement therefore renders the United Nations impotent, because it
cannot prevent member states from breaking the law, thus rendering the
international legal system illegitimate.
Glennon cites as examples Article 2 of the U.N. Charter, which sets
forth general prohibitions against the use of force by member states,"9 as
well as Article 5 1, which provides for an "inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary
to maintain international peace and security."'.. These laws have not
stopped member states from attacking and invading other states without
having first been attacked themselves. Glennon points out that these
provisions have been violated with impunity well over one hundred times
since the Charter's ratification in I945. ' Moreover, in the absence of ef-
fective sanctions, states continue to ignore U.N. restraints on the use of
force and initiate wars of aggression more often than they act in self-
defense. As a result of its continual violation, Glennon argues, the Char-
ter cannot be considered valid law. As Glennon puts it,
[t]he international legal system is voluntary and states are bound only
by rules to which they consent. A treaty can lose its binding effect if a
sufficient number of parties engage in conduct that is at odds with the
constraints of the treaty. The consent of United Nations member states
to the general prohibition against the use of force, as expressed in the
I 7. Michael J. Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, May-June 2003, at 16;
Michael J. Glennon, How War Left the Law Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2002, at A37.
I i8. Glennon, How War Left the Law Behind, supra note 117.
I i9. U.N. CHARTER art. 2.
120. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
121. Glennon, How War Left the Law Behind, supra note 117.
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Charter, has in this way been supplanted by a changed intent as ex-
pressed in deeds.'
Glennon's final point, that the Charter has been superseded by a
changed intent of the member states as expressed in their actions, is un-
sound. Disregard for the law does not necessarily vitiate it. The Eight-
eenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, for example, was
not invalidated by the changed intent of consumers as expressed by their
consumption of alcohol during Prohibition.' 3 Even when the states them-
selves embraced the intent to rescind Prohibition and acted in accor-
dance therewith by neglecting to enforce it, this intent did not serve to
nullify the Amendment until the appropriate number of states ratified its
repeal. Similarly, in other legal contexts, deeds alone are insufficient to
defeat legally binding commitments. Failure to comply with the Conven-
tion Against Mercenaries, therefore, would not serve to vitiate its prohi-
bition.
3. Does International Law Depend on Enforceable Sanctions?
Another common misperception regarding international law is the
equation of the binding character of law with the imposition of sanctions
for its violation. This equation of being bound with the likelihood of suf-
fering sanctions echoes John Austin's "command" positivism, according
to which law consists merely of commands backed by threats.' 4 The cor-
responding belief that law is dependent on the threat of force is widely
held. Hans Kelsen, for example, arrives at this conclusion from a starting
point analogous to Glennon's view discussed above. Kelsen conceives of
international law as a primitive legal order characterized by the tech-
nique of self-help in the absence of an objective authority competent to
decide conflicts among states. He regards the content of international law
as norms arising out of custom that "create obligations or rights for all
states.''.5 Yet Kelsen, like Austin, adheres to the view that "so-called in-
ternational law is 'law,' if it is a coercive order, that is to say, a set of
norms regulating human behavior by attaching certain coercive acts
(sanctions) as consequences" for violations. ,
6
In The Concept of Law, however, Hart famously demonstrated the
inadequacy of Austin's theory and its progeny.' 7 According to Hart, to
122. Id.
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. Of course, this analogy
turns on only one provision of an agreement, not an agreement in its entirety; but this narrowed scope
does not weaken the analogy, given the numerous ways in which parties bound to an agreement can
violate it from time to time without causing its nullification.
124. HART, supra note 113, at 217.
125. HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 323 (Max Knight trans., 1989) (2d ed. i96o).
126. Id. at 320. He identifies the potential sanctions as reprisals and war.
127. HART, supra note 113, at 79-99.
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understand how law creates obligations legal philosophers must take
both an "internal" and an "external" perspective on the law, whereas
Austin takes only the latter.2' The "external" point of view looks only at
what subjects are likely to do in response to the rules that govern them.
This view, although necessary to understanding behavior, imagines rules
as little more than commands. By contrast, the "internal" point of view
Hart calls for considers why people respond to rules in the way they do -
i.e. the norms that govern them-from the perspective of the participants
in the system."9 As Hart argued, Austin's account of positivism is impov-
erished, in part because he failed to address the critical importance of
rules in conceptualizing a legal system. Rules differ meaningfully from
commands: Commands can oblige, or "force," an actor to do something,
but only rules can obligate, or "create a duty" for, an actor to do some-
thing.3 ' Failure to fulfill a duty does not render it invalid. By ignoring the
notion of obligation, Austin thereby ignored the normative component
of law. Without a normative component, one is left not with a legal sys-
tem but a system of authoritarian force. By contrast, according to Hart,
"once we free ourselves from the.., conception of law as essentially an
order backed by threats, there seems no good reason for limiting the
normative idea of obligation to rules supported by organized sanc-
tions.", .3'
Hart does, however, raise one weakness in the argument that laws
can be binding in the absence of sanctions. As Hart points out, the neces-
sity of sanctions can also be defined as their function "as a guarantee that
those who would voluntarily obey shall not be sacrificed to those would
not. To obey, without this, would be to risk going to the wall. Given this
standing danger, what reason demands is voluntary co-operation in a co-
ercive system.' 32 In addressing a similar question, Elihu Root offers a
perspective on this issue that suggests a way in which such voluntary co-
operation could come about in a system that is in fact very low on coer-
cive force, such as the international legal regime. Noting that the
"apparent absence of sanction for the enforcement of the rules of inter-
national law has led great authority to deny that those rules are entitled
to be called law at all," Root counters that there are in fact "sanctions for
the enforcement of international law no less real and substantial than
those which secure obedience to municipal law."'33 He asserts that it is a
128. Id. at 82-91.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 218.
132. Id. at 198.
133. Elihu Root, The Sanction of International Law, 2 AM. J. INT'L L. 451,451-52 (i908).
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mistake to assume that sanctions are the chief mechanism for securing
obedience to law, either municipal or international.'" In most cases, indi-
viduals refrain from unpermitted conduct primarily our of fear of incur-
ring "the public condemnation and obloquy which would follow a
repudiation of the standard of conduct prescribed by that community for
its members," rather than out of fear of the official legal sanction.'35
This balance of motivations, Root suggests, also induces states to
comply with international law or convention even in the absence of offi-
cial legal sanctions.16 Root posits that, historically, the transformation of
isolated nations into a community of nations subject to the potential
condemnation of worldwide public opinion for failure to conform to the
emerging standards of conduct resulted in a widespread willingness to
comply with international law. This compliance has been based both on
the fear of isolation threatened by condemnation and "partly upon the
knowledge that in the give and take of international affairs it is better for
every nation to secure the protection of the law by complying with it than
to forfeit the law's benefits by ignoring it.' 37 In either case, the influence
of international law has not been dependent on enforcement by explicit
punitive sanctions.
The two questions posed in this section and the last-whether inter-
national law can survive the absence of sanctions or compliance-are
both related to a more fundamental issue: the marked inequality among
states participating in the international community. The very possibility
of the existence of international law rests on the artificial premise of
equality among sovereign states before the law. Hart therefore points out
that the "vast disparities in strength and vulnerability.., between the
units of international law is one of the things that has imparted to it a
character so different from municipal law and limited the extent to which
it is capable of operating as an organized coercive system."' 8 This factual
inequality directly calls into question the "system of mutual forbearance
and compromise which is the base of both legal and moral obligation" in
municipal law.
39
Nevertheless, even in the absence of literal equality of power among
states, formal equality before the law seems to be a necessary component
of an international legal system. As Cecil Hurst, Legal Adviser to the
British Delegation in the League of Nations and one of the founders of
134. Id. at 452.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 456.
137. Id. at 455.




the World Court, notes, "[i]t is only in respect of [the] right to manage
their own affairs that States are equal-a principle that may be ade-
quately summarized as equality before the law."'' 40 According to Hurst,
this constitutive condition means that no state can exempt itself from re-
quirements imposed on other states. He argues that, by its very nature,
international law therefore remains binding even in the absence of sanc-
tions: "[T]o be subject to and to be bound by the rules of international
law is the necessary consequence of existence as a State.' 4' Hurst rea-
sons that, because they stand equal before the law, no state can "put for-
ward a claim as a claim of right on behalf of itself or of its citizens which
in the converse circumstances it would refuse to admit could be put for-
ward against itself."'" As a result, equality before the law should obligate
each state to admit that "it cannot claim from other States a rule of be-
haviour to which it would not itself conform."'43 Because the community
of nations consists of all states, this circumstance "implies that there must
be rules of general application upon which the practice of States should
be founded," without regard to whether those rules are either enforce-
able by means of sanctions or even adhered to in fact.'"
In conclusion, it appears that Glennon and others who argue that in-
ternational law is more imaginary than real because of a failure of com-
pliance and a paucity of sanctions are mistaken. International law does
exist and is appropriately regarded as law. Answering these threshold
questions nevertheless leaves unanswered the central question of how
such law can give rise to an obligation of compliance.
C. DOES INTERNATIONAL LAW CREATE LEGAL OBLIGATION?
Legal philosophers have long puzzled over the question identified by
Hart as the central question with respect to international law: "Can such
rules as these be meaningfully and truthfully said ever to give rise to ob-
ligations?"'4 Hart himself answered this question affirmatively; however,
Joseph Raz has brought to light serious complications with the concept
of legal obligation that call into question whether international law really
can be legally obligatory. In turn, other legal theorists have addressed
Raz's reservations. Tony Honor6 argues that international law creates
legal obligations as a result of a basic norm of a duty to cooperate in a
common international enterprise demanding accommodation among
140. Cecil J.B. Hurst, The Nature of International Law and the Reason Why It Is Binding on States,
30 TRANS. OF GROTIUS SOC'Y 119, 121 (1944).
141. Id. at 127.
142. Id. at 123.
r43. Id.
r44. Id.
145. HART, supra note 113, at 217.
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states. John Finnis draws on an analogous norm concerning resolution of
cooperation problems in the international community to show that cus-
tomary international law can also give rise to obligations. Although the
particular disputes taken up by these theorists may never be fully re-
solved, it appears on balance that there is significant support for the con-
tention that international law can and does create legal obligations.
i. Hart's Criteria for Creating Legal Obligation
International law appears to satisfy the criteria Hart specifies as nec-
essary for rules to give rise legal obligation. Hart identifies as the primary
criterion governing whether a rule can impose an obligation the circum-
stance that "the general demand for conformity is insistent and the social
pressure brought to bear on those who deviate or threaten to deviate is
great."'' 6 The social pressure need not involve legal or physical sanctions
and may in fact be nothing more than verbal disapproval or appeals to
the violator's respect for the rule violated. In addition to this primary cri-
terion, Hart identifies two other characteristics of obligation. First, the
rules to whose violation this social pressure attaches must be "thought
important because they are believed to be necessary to the maintenance
of social life or some highly prized feature of it."' 47 Second, in addition to
benefiting others, the conduct such rules require is generally in conflict
with the interests of the person on whom they impose the obligation of
compliance.4
International law satisfies all three of these criteria: It is widely ac-
cepted that states violating recognized international laws and conven-
tions are subjected to verbal and/or moral formal disapproval by other
members of the international community, and the demand for confor-
mity to these rules is consistently applied with few exceptions. In addi-
tion, it is widely recognized that the purpose of international law is to
facilitate the very survival of an international community, meaning that
pressure to obey the rules of international law is applied because adher-
ence to those rules is thought essential to the maintenance of that com-
munity. Finally, the essential requirements imposed by many
international laws are that states conduct themselves in a way that bene-
fits the international community while imposing limits on their abilities
to pursue their individual interests. In fact, Hart himself acknowledges
the validity of a similar argument:
It is clear that in the practice of states certain rules are regularly re-
spected, even at the cost of certain sacrifices; claims are formulated by
146. Id. at 86.




reference to them; breaches of the rules expose the offender to serious
criticism and are held to justify claims for compensation or retaliation.
These, surely, are all the elements required to support the statement
that there exist among states rules imposing obligations upon them.'49
2. Raz's Objection to the Notion of a Legal Obligation
Although international law therefore appears to meet the formal
definition of rules that can create legal obligations, Joseph Raz offers an
argument suggesting both that it is perhaps too hasty to conclude that in-
ternational law does in fact create such obligations, and that what we
mean when we speak of a legal obligation may be more accurately
termed a moral or prudential obligation. Raz distinguishes an obligation
to obey the law from an independent reason to do that which the law re-
quires, noting that "[tihe obligation to obey the law implies that the rea-
son to do that which is required by law is the very fact that it is so
required."'' 0 Therefore, an obligation to obey the law "is a general obli-
gation applying to all the law's subjects and to all the laws on all the oc-
casions to which they apply.''. In other words, such an obligation would
need to rest on the desirability of always doing as the law requires, and
could not be based on the fact that adherence to the law would facilitate
certain goals.
From this perspective, a true obligation would preclude an argument
that empirical reasons could justify exceptions to that obligation. An ar-
gument, for example, that disobedience was warranted under certain cir-
cumstances in which it would produce a desirable outcome would be
incomprehensible: Not only would the ground supporting the exception
(a desirable empirical outcome) be incommensurable with the underlying
reason for the obligation (a categorical principle), but the argument that
it was desirable to violate the law under certain circumstances would
straightforwardly contradict the premise on which the obligation de-
pended-that what was desirable was always doing as the law required.
Raz suggests that the only allowable exceptions to such an obligation are
those explicitly recognized by the law itself, which "assumes the right to
determine in what conditions legal requirements are defeated by other
considerations," such as self-defense or necessity.'52
Raz's argument is difficult to counter, because he highlights the pri-
mary reason why it seems desirable that international law should create
obligations -which is that the outcomes will generally be better if states
that find it in their interest to violate international laws or conventions
149. Id. at 231.
150. JOSEPH RAZ, THE AuTHORITy OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 234 (1979).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 236.
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are precluded from doing so by an obligation to follow those laws -and
argues persuasively that this type of reason does not form the foundation
for a legal obligation to obey the law. Notwithstanding this definitional
complication, however, the fact remains that there appears to be a basis
in the very existence of international law for creation of some sort of
binding obligation.
3. The Basic Norm of International Law as Interpreted by Honore
Tony Honor6 examines the foundations of law itself, and of interna-
tional law in particular, in an effort to determine what this basis is for de-
riving legal obligation from international laws. 53 Addressing the
rudiments of law, Honor6 observes that laws arise as a means of coordi-
nating the conduct of members of groups. In order to sustain coordina-
tion, groups develop conventions, which themselves acquire normative
force. For those conventions to evolve into laws, techniques of rein-
forcement are also developed. Honor6 distinguishes three types of
norms: substantive norms, which are the conventions themselves; reme-
dial norms, which "prescribe what is to happen when substantive norms
are violated"; and source norms, which function essentially as rules of
recognitionf"4- the essential secondary rules that specify the conditions
of validity for other secondary rules. According to Honor6, "[n]orms
which are interrelated and supported in these ways count as laws."'55 The
normativity of this type of rule is social normativity, which Honor6 dis-
tinguishes from the "genuine, objective normativity" that constitutes le-
gal obligation.': Honor6 defines such obligation as follows: "Law
purports to prescribe obligations which bind citizens irrespective of the
penalties for disobedience. The penalties are imposed on the assumption
that the obligations, breach of which leads to their imposition, are inde-
pendently binding."'57 On this definition, laws create obligations regard-
less of sanctions. Honor6 elaborates that laws bind the members of a
society
provided they have a duty to co-operate with one another in pursuing the
common enterprise on which the group is engaged. Since the members
of the group to whom the laws apply are ordinarily the same as those
who have a duty to co-operate, laws create obligations in so far as they
prescribe appropriate modes of co-operation.
153. TONY HONORt, MAKING LAW BIND: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL (1987).
154. Id. at 4. Hart describes his rule of recognition as "specifying 'sources' of law and providing
general criteria for the identification of its rules." HART, supra note 113, at 214.
155. HONORJ, supra note 153, at 4.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 5 (footnote omitted).
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He arrives at this definition-that laws impose obligations on all mem-
bers to whom they apply by prescribing appropriate rules of coopera-
tion -by positing that the duty to cooperate is in fact the basic norm of a
society.
Honor6's starting point in articulating the basic norm is Hans Kel-
sen's view that a legal system requires a basic norm in order to render
consistent the demands made on members of a society. By means of ad-
herence to a basic norm that is neutral among competing moral and po-
litical viewpoints, laws are able to create obligations. Honor6 argues,
however, that, "contrary to Kelsen's view, the norm which guarantees
consistency must be a substantive norm."'59 The basic norm that he pro-
poses is therefore "that the members of a society have a duty to co-
operate with one another," from which it follows that members of a soci-
ety have a duty to foster cooperation through compliance with "restric-
tions on their freedom imposed in the interests of others by social
convention or by institutions. According to Honore, this proposed ba-
sic norm serves as justification for "all forms of obligation, legal, moral,
social, and political.",'
6'
With respect to international law, Honor6 departs even further from
Kelsen's reasoning. Kelsen posits that norms prescribing what ought to
or ought not happen confer legal meaning on actions, renderin them le-
gal or illegal by turning the ought into an objective meaning. Kelsen's
basic norm consists in "a presupposition, establishing the objective valid-
ity of the norms of a moral or legal order,"'6 3 similar to Hart's rule of rec-
ognition.' 64 Kelsen elaborates that this basic norm "must be a norm that
established custom-the reciprocal behaviour of the states-as a law-
creating material fact."' 6' According to Honor6, however, Kelsen's basic
norm of international law-the principle that agreements must be kept
or that customary behavior should be maintained-could not give rise to
an obligation to obey because there is no duty to make agreements or to
respect detrimental customs.'66 Honor6 suggests, therefore, that "[i]f
modern international law is binding on states it can only be by virtue of
the more far-reaching principle that states have a duty to co-operate, when
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their interests conflict, with a view to arriving at an accommodation."'
67
The basic norm on which this obligation rests is the duty of cooperation
in the common enterprise, which itself requires the accommodation of
the interests of various states.
Given this inter-state basic norm, much of Honor6's reasoning re-
garding laws imposed by states on their citizens is applicable in the inter-
national context as well. As he points out, "international law is a sort of
state law: not the law of the group of which the state is composed but the
law of the group which states themselves compose.' 61 In other words, the
reasons obligating individuals to comply with state-created laws can be
analogized to the reasons obligating states to comply with international
laws and conventions. Because of the strong dependence among states
and the dearth of alternatives to participation in the global international
community, there should be an even greater incentive for states to com-
ply with international law and convention. Whereas an individual citizen
can often switch membership to a more favorable state, a state isolated
from the international community would be without any alternative.
Even in cases in which the international community lacks a concentrated
reserve of force, "[tihe capacity of the international society to refuse rec-
ognition to or ostracize delinquent states corresponds in the case of that
society to the capacity of the sovereign state to deploy its predominant
reserve of physical force."
'69
Honor6's argument also lends support to the view defended above,
that the obligatory nature of international law is independent of its
power to impose sanctions. As in the case of state laws, which appear to
create an obligation to obey independent of the actual imposition of
sanctions backed by force, the obligations imposed by international laws
are not dependent on the actual exercise of the power to ostracize but
are simply generally effective "because the international society has at its
disposal in the last resort a drastic threat.' 7 The obligation compo-
nent-on Honor6's theory-arises both from the fact of participation in
the joint venture of cooperative coexistence, and from the efficacy of the
law or convention in question at promotion of the common interest
through furtherance of this cooperation. Force, whether through the
means of an ambiguous threat or as a backing to explicit sanctions, plays
a role only in the last of these components: the actual effectiveness of the
law in leading citizens or states to honor the obligations it independently
creates. If we agree with Raz that this type of consideration is out of
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bounds with respect to obligation to obey the law, yet still assert that le-
gal obligation is possible on the basis of participation in a joint venture,
then an absence of sanctions or of an effective enforcement mechanism
would leave unmarred the fact of a legal obligation to comply with inter-
national law.
In fact, Honord specifies that the duty to cooperate on which the
obligatory nature of law and convention depends is defined (and limited)
by the purposes of the society to which the members belong. 7' In the in-
ternational context, whether laws give rise to obligations is therefore de-
pendent on the purpose of international society, which he describes as
the establishment of accommodation among states in furtherance of the
members' interests. In such circumstances, unless the common enterprise
were abandoned or the purpose of international society rejected, the re-
fusal to abide by the prescriptions imposed by existing international laws
in furtherance of that purpose would do nothing to disprove the obliga-
tory nature of those laws.
Finally, the absence of official sanctions does not detract from either
the obligatory nature of international law and conventions or the power
of threat that serves as an additional reason for compliance with those
obligations. This reasoning parallels the clarification offered by Hart of
Austin's view of laws as commands backed by force. International law
thus conceived contains the necessary element to obligate rather than
merely to oblige.'72 This obligation, because it rests on something more
than a mere command, is not dissipated by the absence of sanctions actu-
ally applied with the force necessary to oblige compliance.
Honor6's interpretation of the way in which international law cre-
ates obligations therefore seems relatively conclusive in theory. The au-
thority of a purported legal obligation is tested in practice, however,
when the law generating the obligation comes into conflict with another
law. The practical validity of Honor6's theory seems as if it would hold
even when confronted by conflicting obligations arising out of member-
ship in another group-yet the primary reason for this would be that the
threat of force that other states could marshal against a violator of inter-
national law is the strongest conceivable motivation for acting or refrain-
ing from acting against one's own interests. As a result, actors confronted
with conflicting obligations are likely "to obey the group which disposes
of the greatest reserve of force. This is true even when the people whose
duties conflict would, if free from threat, prefer some other group.""
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Because of the magnitude of the threat that could conceivably be posed
by an international community of states attempting to impose compli-
ance with its norms-either officially or unofficially -the greatest con-
ceivable force that could be brought to bear on a state faced with
conflicting obligations should in theory be the force backing the interna-
tional community as a whole. On this account, it would make sense to fa-
vor international law even where it conflicts with other state obligations.
Although this reasoning at first appears to conflict with the idea that
sanctions are not necessary to the obligatory nature of law, the force at
issue here is actually independent of sanctions, although it may be a nec-
essary condition for inflicting sanctions. In fact, what Honor6 suggests is
most important about the relationship among laws, sanctions, and force
is that the body imposing the law-in most cases, the state-"should
have at its disposal greater force than other groups, because that makes
possible an effective system of sanctions," not the fact of an actual sanc-
tion triggered by the violation of each law or norm.'74
4. Does Customary International Law also Give
Rise to Obligations?
Even if positive international law can therefore be shown to create
legal obligations, this does not answer the question whether customary
law, which is the primary basis for standards and conventions governing
international relations, can also give rise to such obligations. Hans Kel-
sen, who characterizes norms of international law as based on customs
arising out of the acts of states, addresses this question directly.'75 He ar-
gues that those norms obligate states "to a certain behavior by attaching
'sanctions' (reprisals or war) to the opposite behavior; in this way inter-
national law forbids this behavior as a delict and prescribes its oppo-
site."'16 As a result, a state whose rights have been violated by another
state is "only authorized... to react with a sanction against infringe-
ment."'77 Thus, it would appear that on Kelsen's view, customary interna-
tional law could not impose a legal obligation without the enforcement
mechanism of a sanction.
John Finnis suggests that this type of thinking rests on mistaken as-
sumptions regarding the possible source of such laws. Finnis puts forth an
argument that custom can give rise to binding obligations on a basis simi-
lar to that proposed by Honor: a framework enabling cooperation in the
furtherance of the common good. This argument addresses an array of
doubts regarding the potential authoritativeness of customary interna-
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tional law, including the complications raised by both Kelsen and Glen-
non.
Finnis asserts that an authoritative rule can arise through custom
"without the benefit of any authorized way of generating rules."'"8 He
identifies the basic requirements for the development of such authorita-
tive customary law in the international sphere as the convergence among
states of a deliberate practice accompanied by an appropriate attitude or
intention. Finnis rejects the received view, set forth in Oppenheim's trea-
tise on international law, 79 that the requisite attitude is a conviction that
the action or practice in question is obligatory according to international
law, because "this is paradoxical, for it proposes that a customary norm
can come into existence (i.e. become authoritative) only by virtue of the
necessarily erroneous belief that it is already in existence (i.e. authorita-
tive)."' Finnis would rescue this reasoning on the basis of an empirical
judgment by substituting two practical judgments:
(a) in this domain of human affairs... it would be appropriate to
have some determinate, common, and stable pattern of conduct
and, correspondingly, an authoritative rule requiring that pattern
of conduct; to have this is more desirable than leaving conduct in
this domain to the discretion of individual states;
(b) this particular pattern of conduct.. . is appropriate, or would be if
generally adopted and acquiesced in, for adoption as an authorita-
tive common rule of conduct.'
Characterizing these judgments as affirmations that certain conduct is
desirable both in general and in particular, Finnis finds them at the root
of appeals to treaties or resolutions of international bodies as sources or
evidence of custom. Although desirability would ideally be assessed pri-
marily in terms of the common good of the entire international commu-
nity and only secondarily in terms of the interests of the state making a
judgment, he asserts that even the common reversal of this order of im-
portance does not present an insurmountable obstacle to the formation
of custom.
Finnis emphasizes that these practical judgments "are distinct from
the empirical judgement that many (or few) states in fact subscribe to
them," as well as from further empirical judgments regarding the number
of states converging in the specified pattern of conduct and the acquies-
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cence of other states in this conduct.82 These three empirical judgments
are in fact prerequisites to a separate practical judgment that renders
paradoxical traditional accounts of international law such as Oppen-
heim's claim that custom results from a belief that a practice is obliga-
tory, i.e. a judgment that affirms "that the empirically widespread making
of the two practical judgements ((a) and (b)), and the empirical concur-
rence of practice and generality (not necessarily universality) of acquies-
cence, together warrant the claim that a custom exists as an authoritative
legal norm."' 83 This judgment makes an unwarranted leap, in other
words, from empirical statements about state practice and opinion, to the
practical claim that these conditions result in a legal norm whose re-
quirements are justified thereby. The paradox does not lie in "the classic
notion that, [in] order to amount to an authoritative custom, a course of
practice must be accompanied by a particular sort of attitude," but in the
idea that practice and opinion together are sufficient to create an au-
thoritative norm.'8 4 Instead, this seemingly paradoxical judgment must
implicitly rely on a meta-legal principle concerning the international
community to lend an "action-guiding and requirement-imposing force"
to the legal norm derived from the existence of the three empirical condi-
tions.8 8 The suppressed practical premise inherent in this argument is
that "the emergence and recognition of customary rules.., is a desirable
or appropriate method of solving interaction or co-ordination problems
in the international community.""[ Finnis asserts that the formation of
custom is possible only because this principle is even more widely em-
braced among states than the two practical principles identified above. In
other words,
the general authoritativeness of custom depends upon the fact that cus-
tom-formation has been adopted in the international community as an
appropriate method of rule-creation. For, given this fact, recognition of
the authoritativeness of particular customs affords all states an oppor-
tunity of furthering the common good of the international community
by solving interaction and co-ordination problems otherwise insoluble.
And this opportunity is the root of all legal authority, whether it be the
authority of rulers or (as here) of rules.'
Finnis concludes therefore that the underlying framework of treating
custom-formation as a source of authoritative norms is itself part of cus-
tom, so that "the requirements, pre-conditions, and forms of custom-
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formation are themselves determined, in large part, by custom," the ac-
tual authoritativeness of which ultimately rests on "the fact that, if
treated as authoritative, they enable states to solve their co-ordination
problems - a fact that has normative significance because the common
good requires that those co-ordination problems be solved.""' Thus, Fin-
nis proposes an understanding of the obligatory nature of customary law
analogous to Honor6's framework based on the necessity and benefits of
cooperation. In the cases of both positive and customary international
law, that framework supports an obligation to act in accordance with the
goals of cooperation. In other words, the basic norm of cooperation that
Honor6 proposes as the basic norm of a society, and thus of its legal sys-
tem, is also the basic norm of international society, as Finnis points out,
and therefore makes customary international law binding. The principle
of cooperation, then, as the reason that underlies all law, is also the ulti-
mate foundation for all legal obligations under international law.
D. Is THE OBLIGATION CREATED BY INTERNATIONAL LAW
LEGAL OR MORAL?
The reasoning above seems to suggest that, if we accept the Honor6-
Finnis framework of cooperation as the foundation for international
law's obligatory nature, international law may not give rise to a pure le-
gal obligation after all. The opportunity of furthering the common good
that Finnis identifies, as well as the obligation of participation that
Honor6 takes to be the basic norm, in some sense draw on moral rather
than legal obligations. At bottom, these obligations are based on an as-
sessment of the moral or prudential value of the consequences of com-
pliance with international law. Is what this Note has been arguing is a
legal obligation in fact simply a moral obligation? Given the kind of con-
siderations underlying the framework conception put forward by Honor6
and Finnis, it is plausible that the characteristic obligations derived from
international law and conventions are in fact primarily moral. Because
these obligations are posited on the basis of the desirability of interna-
tional cooperation in pursuit of the common good, it seems natural to
characterize the argument that states preferring to pursue their own in-
terests are nevertheless obligated to obey conflicting international
rules -regardless of whether those rules are accompanied by sanctions-
as more of a moral argument than a legal argument.
As usual, however, Hart has something to say against this view. He
observes that the tendency to interpret rules governing relations among




form of social structure that is not reducible to orders backed by threats
can only be a form of 'morality. ' ''8 9 Hart objects that this viewpoint
would require such a broad definition of morality that it would defeat the
purpose of distinguishing moral from legal rules, and goes on to offer
specific reasons why this is particularly inappropriate in the case of inter-
national law.""9 For instance, in assessing the conduct of other states,
states themselves commonly refer to considerations of morality using
very different terms from the arguments made against states' violations
of international law. 91 Furthermore, the content of many rules of interna-
tional law is morally neutral, because they are created simply in further-
ance of the efficiency gained by having a clear, fixed rule governing a
particular subject-matter. Finally, Hart emphasizes that the very exis-
tence of the conditions necessary for international rules to impose obliga-
tions is enough to create a foundation for international law and that it is
nonsensical to suggest that an additional moral component is required.'92
Even if it would be beneficial to the system of international law for states
to regard compliance as morally obligatory, there are numerous non-
moral reasons that might also motivate compliance, making it unneces-
sary to insist on a moral ground therefor.'93
Regardless of the extent to which the obligations created by interna-
tional law rest on a moral justification, as opposed to a purely legal justi-
fication, the arguments above clearly demonstrate that there is a binding
character to international laws and conventions. Even if it remains ulti-
mately impossible to prove such an obligation in a manner that would re-
fute critique, the welfare of the international community depends on it
being the case that this obligation is treated as real. As Honor6 and Fin-
nis suggest, the ultimate source of international law-or, for that matter,
any law-springs from the need for sustained coordination and coopera-
tion in pursuit of the general interest and demands mutual accommoda-
tion, particularly where this conflicts with individual interests. In order to
maintain any international system at all, therefore, states must regard
themselves as bound to comply with international laws and conventions.
Even taking into account the likelihood that specific demands of compli-
ance will at times conflict with the interests of a particular state, the
overall benefits of participation in an international community are unde-
niably significant enough to outweigh any individual interest. The alter-
native-ostracism from the international community-is so bleak a
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prospect in today's highly globalized climate that it ought to serve as
sanction enough to motivate compliance with international law, regard-
less of the existence and enforceability of more formal sanctions. Thus,
there is ample ground supporting the conclusion that the spirit of inter-
national law compels adherence to its commitment against mercenarism
regardless of the inadvertent and presumably temporary departure of the
letter of the law therefrom.
CONCLUSION
As noted by U.N. Special Rapporteur Ballesteros, mercenarism "af-
fects the self-determination of peoples and serves foreign interests that
pose a threat to life and to the natural resources, political stability and
territorial integrity of the affected countries and.., is linked to violations
of human rights.""' In its modern form, mercenarism is concealed by a
corporate veil. Revealing what is concealed is the necessary first step to-
ward imposing meaningful constraints on the increasingly widespread re-
sort to mercenarism. In theory, under existing international law it should
be possible to hold state actors who hire mercenaries accountable for any
serious crimes they commit. In practice, however, certain states, primar-
ily the United States, have thus far proven able to escape the dictates of
international law. Nonetheless, as the images to have emerged from an
Iraqi prison remind us, a great deal is at stake in resolving this dilemma.
The importance of adopting a realistic international definition of
modern mercenarism is therefore outweighed by the more difficult task
of making international law bind. In order to effectuate the intent of the
international community to discourage the use of mercenaries, efforts
should be made to impute criminal liability for their crimes not only to
the corporations that employ them but to the relevant state actors who
hire them. Holding state actors accountable could serve as a serious de-
terrent to modern mercenarism.
Such a state of affairs is theoretically attainable, because contempo-
rary international law satisfies the requirements of a legal system capable
of creating legal obligations. States that disregard the clear spirit of the
existing body of law and convention are therefore violating real obliga-
tions. In former times, such rogue states were often brought into line
with international standards by the exertion of community pressure. To-
day, however, a primary violator of international law is also arguably the
world's most powerful state. The unprecedented combination of the abil-
ity and the motivation to act with impunity in the international sphere
carries with it a threat to the very foundations of the international legal
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order. Ironically, the self-interest whose pursuit is deemed sufficient to
justify this disregard for international laws is itself ultimately jeopardized
by their violation. As future Nobel peace laureate Elihu Root admon-
ished in 19o8:
There is no civilized country now which is not sensitive to this general
opinion, none that is willing to subject itself to the discredit of standing
brutally on its power to deny to other countries the benefit of recog-
nized rules of right conduct. The deference shown to this international
public opinion is in due proportion to a nation's greatness and advance
in civilization. The nearest approach to defiance will be found among
the most isolated and least civilized of countries, whose ignorance of
the world prevents the effect of the world's opinion; and in every such
country internal disorder, oppression, poverty, and wretchedness mark
the penalties which warn mankind that the laws established by civiliza-
tion for the guidance of national conduct can not be ignored with im-
punity.'95
It is time that the force of such opinion should once again prevail in the
determination of both how mercenarism should be defined and the ex-
tent to which it should be constrained.
195. Root, supra note 133, at 455.
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